Reviews


At a moment when activism against corporate globalization and militarism is on the decided increase, *From ACT UP to the WTO* comes as both a welcome tribute and a trusty handbook. As Eric Rofes suggests in the foreword, this book is “a new literature capturing narratives of a new activism currently igniting our nation” (p. xii). I fully concur with that assessment. Like Rofes, I am excited about the prospect of an anthology that links and describes these movements for my students. This book is a wonderful contribution to the literature on activist communities and provides both an accessible treatment of theoretical musings on activism and a demonstration through the various accounts of how direct theorizing¹ works within and among movements. I look forward to using the book in my politics and social movements classes.

Having said that, and ironically, like the generations of activists before mine, I tend to think that the modes of activism that I cut my teeth on are the formative influences for the “next generation” as well. This anthology posits ACT UP as the locus for a new kind of direct action movement characterized by multiple agendas and joy. In generating an origin story of activism there is the danger of leaving out the ways in which other forms of organizing, democracy and social justice approaches have indeed shaped even the most invigorated and new movements. While the book attends to the timeframe between the rise of ACT UP in 1987 and the 1999 Battle in Seattle as a continuum, I notice from my experience that 1987 was a nodal point of anti-nuclear activism that could mark its beginning at Seabrook in the post Three Mile Island atmosphere, which has feminist roots in the meetings that organized the very theatrical direct actions of the 1980 and 1981 Women’s Pentagon Actions, and on to the Nevada Test Site for the “Mothers and Others Day Action,” 1987.² These activist organizations and movements produced results, refined teaching tools for civil disobedience, direct action campaigns, nonviolence as strategy, and life choice. The new social movement theories employed in this book to explain some of the paradigms of activism represented here were developed to account for the proliferation of activist identities in the 1970s and beyond. While I do want to notice what we


have learned in the very long continuum of movements for justice and peace, I also think that the gift of a book celebrating a generation’s current development of yet stronger and wiser forms of activism is also quite appropriate. So I rest my case as an old geezer of the anti-nuclear movement and attend to the merits of this anthology.

The key shift in movement discourses here is that which Shepard and Hayduk discuss in the introduction as the notion of “glocalism.” While this term is adapted from the 1970s environmental movement’s catchphrase “Think Globally Act Locally,” it here reflects a more developed understanding of the impacts of globalization that were only beginning to be felt in the early flight of capital from organized labor and industrialized nations. Thus Shepard and Hayduk share examples with us of this “new brand of activism aimed at globalizing democracy, rather than corporate rule … consider[ing] strategies of protest, ritual, and community building, reflecting a rejection of the monoculture for an alternative, more spontaneous, and authentic vision of the world” (p. 5).

A major contribution of this anthology is precisely its attention to and accounts of the interconnections between these movements, and indeed the flow of activists, ideas, and strategies between them. This is the lesson of the new movements: that the process is less about finding compromise by creating coalitions than it is about the core understanding that the issues, from fighting local and global manifestations of racism and heterosexism, to accessibility of generic drugs for HIV and AIDS protocols, to corporate profiteering on the backs of workers, to campaigns against blood for oil wars, are each and all interconnected in terms of the questions of social justice and peace that are core to glocal activism.

While the introductory chapters make perhaps too strong a case for the uniqueness of the movements marked by ACT UP and anti-globalization, the structure of the anthology lends itself well to developing a nuanced picture of the new social movements discussed here. The book is divided into several key sections. Moving from a section most explicitly about theorizing and historicizing activism in Part One, the next four sections are an impressive mix of reflection on and direct account of movement strategies, processes, successes, and challenges. In Part One, Lesley J. Wood and Kelly Moore set a tone for the book in describing the ways that ACT UP changed the pattern in activism, creating a characteristically “new political stream by drawing upon the affinity group model used by American anti-nuclear activists, using the anarchist, pacifist, and civil rights tradition of localized decision-making; the direct action techniques of pacifists who physically confronted systems of power through ‘misuse’ of spaces; and feminist emphasis on process” (p. 28). What Wood and Moore describe sounds like the direct action movement with which I am familiar, and the ability of ACT UP to encourage local decision-making and a diversity of targets, the increased mobility and multivalent strategies of activists is part of the stunning and wonderful newness, as I see it. Precisely, as Wood and Moore describe it, there is a strong sense and practice of local decision-making about the targets of action tied to a sophisticated understanding of the ways that local and global powers are linked and thus to the ways activist agendas in seemingly disparate communities are thus inextricable linked. The practices, as I understand from Wood and Moore’s descriptions, harken to the model developed in 1987 by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in describing the new
social movements; indeed these new forms seem to be fully practicing the creation of chains of equivalence that form in surges of common cause and create multiple nodal points for action.3 These movements are by these accounts practicing with vigor the kinds of nonhierarchical collective action that the anti-nuclear activists worked to create space for. The second article in this section is written by L. A. Kauffman, who demonstrates in “A Short History of Radical Renewal” that “Seattle was the culmination of a thirty year long process of political reinvention” (p. 35). Her article supports my point that “very little about the structure or organizing methods of the anti-globalization movement is especially new” (p. 37), but she goes on to suggest that in fact two aspects of these movements are new and important to recognize: first, the style of ACT UP, and in particular the very vibrant street politics; and second, the centrality of “lesbian activists, both white and of color, who most often formed the bridge between one movement and the next, transmitting skills, insight and expertise” (p. 36). If Kauffman’s article sets the movements in historical context, the article by Starhawk, oft reproduced since Seattle, brings us inside the mature logic of the direct action movement and the organizing strategies practiced by Direct Action Network. What Starhawk recounts about the movement is its reliance on nonviolent nonhierarchical organizing and decentralized power. This is key to the ability of these movements to work outside prevailing models of power as hierarchical, and critical to the frequent successes of the movement in the face of authoritarian models of power. Kaplan’s piece about A25, Ness’s piece about the community labor alliances, Lefkowitz’s work regarding the movement against sweatshops, Mauldin’s account of the organizing of Jubilee 2000 Northwest, and Sawyer’s account of the ACT UP focus on international trade and accessibility of medicines for HIV and AIDS each powerfully narrates the ways in which at specific moments of the movements their glocalism is enacted. Deeply nuanced inter-racial and inter-class organizing is a key and new characteristic. These are riveting tales of direct theorizing and activist inspiration.

Part Two, “Sex, Social Justice, and the New Queer Community Organizing,” and Part Three, “Public Versus Private Spaces, Battlegrounds, and Movements,” bring the conversation directly into glocal events and organizing practices. In this set of articles the authors recount a variety of engagements, coalitions, and activist moments. Part Two mixes participant observer accounts with interviews of activists to present a nuanced integration of different histories, practices, and strategies linking activist causes. For instance, Highleyman shares an account of queer activism’s history to its infusion of the global justice movement, lending credence to Kauffman’s earlier claim regarding the centrality of queers and especially lesbians to multiple movements’ organizing and practices. Feinberg demonstrates the connection between activism around Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., both hate-based murders. The interviews in the section include one with Bob Kohler, veteran of the Stonewall Riots and “part of a group of radical queer activists agitating to force GLBT communities to translate their struggles into broader questions of social justice” (p. 126). There is an interview with Sarah Schulman documenting her activist trajectory from reproductive rights to the Lesbian Avengers. The final interview in this section is with Liddell

Jackson, sharing an oral history of the organization Jacks of Color. The transformation described by Jackson was “from a glorified fuck club to a very important entity addressing issues of racism in the gay male community” (p. 173). These interviews provide direct insights to movement histories and strategic and ideological decision-making practices. They are a key component of the book’s vital contribution. Part Three continues with the ways that particular moments of activism were enacted and engaged others. Ranging from SexPanic! to Church Ladies for Choice, tacking back to “Reclaim the Streets,” the Adelante Street Theater Project, and then community gardens and Students for an Undemocratic Society, these articles all provide inspired windows into these new forms of community building and struggles for justice.

Part Four takes up the question of media strategies and looks at mainstream media accounts of movement spectacle as well as strategies ranging from Indymedia to alternative video production. Part Five, “Race, Poverty, and World Making,” looks to the questions specific to economic restructuring and activism for a living wage. While this section has race explicitly in the title, the remarkable thing about this collection is that its analyses and conceptualizations about the interconnections of race, class, gender, and sexuality issues and politics are demonstrated through the exquisite interweaving of those issues throughout the movements’ accounts and analyses in the book as a whole. The conclusion, by Shepard, represents his intentionality in celebrating and building a revitalized activist project. This book contributes well to his cause.

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Since the Zapatista uprising in Mexico in 1994 and the mass public sector strikes in France in 1995 heralded what we can now identify as an international wave of resistance to neo-liberalism, unions in many countries have been prominently involved in struggles against the panoply of evils often lumped together under the heading of “globalization,” including cuts, privatization, and international agreements designed to expand the rights of capital such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas. This has especially been the case in the global South, as unions in Bolivia, Colombia, Korea, and elsewhere have played leading roles in broad mobilizations of the working class and, in most cases, other layers of the urban and rural poor. Unions in some of the advanced capitalist countries have also been actively involved in mass strikes and protests against neo-liberalism, most noticeably in Italy, France, and Spain (elements of Canadian labor have mobilized too, but the political strikes and demonstrations of the Days of Action in Ontario in the mid-1990s represented a lower level of resistance than that seen in Western Europe and did not succeed in reversing the slow decline that afflicts unions in Canada, much as in the US).

This context helps explain the growing interest in international labor studies in recent years, including research on the impact of globalization on work, workers, and unions and also studies of labor movement responses to changing
conditions. Ronaldo Munck’s *Globalisation and Labour: The New “Great Transformation”* sets out, in its author’s words, “to tell the story of workers and their organisations in the era of capitalist globalisation and their potential to construct a democratic alternative” (p. xi). It aims to provide an accessible overview of this broad topic, drawing on research on the subject across disciplines. As the book’s subtitle indicates, Munck takes Karl Polanyi’s study of the development of the market economy, *The Great Transformation*,¹ as an important theoretical reference point. Munck argues that Polanyi’s analysis of the “double movement”—the expansion of socially disembedded “free” markets that calls forth efforts to defend society from their ravages through regulation—is as pertinent in today’s “Globalisation Revolution” (p. 2) as it was at the time of the Industrial Revolution.

*Globalisation and Labour* opens with an introductory chapter in which Munck draws on the ideas of David Held and Ulrich Beck as well as those of Polanyi to situate “Labour in the Global.” In addition to foregrounding the expansion of the working class on a world scale, Munck argues that “labour and other social movements should be neither for nor against globalisation but, rather, see the issue as one of understanding the complexity of globalisation as a process of social transformation” (p. 6). From here, the book moves through chapters that survey the political economy of the “Golden Era” of post-war capitalism and the subsequent era of globalization, working classes and labor movements in the North and in the South, and “old” (c. 1850–1990) and “new” forms of labor internationalism. The final chapter considers the shape of the contemporary neo-liberal order and a progressive alternative.

Considered within the terms of its author’s objectives and theoretical framework, *Globalisation and Labour* is moderately successful as an overview of an enormous subject. It covers a wide range of issues from a perspective critical of neo-liberalism, and manages to introduce readers to some significant recent developments and debates, such as that surrounding efforts to incorporate social clauses (labor and environmental rights) in international investment and trade agreements. However, in the course of doing so a number of questionable claims are made (for example, Munck labels arguments made by Ellen Meiksins Wood in *Monthly Review* “almost reactionary nationalist and statist,” p. 19; and claims that “The clearly perceived diminishing returns of ‘business as usual’ strategies lead even sectarian and bureaucratic trade-union leaderships in the direction of social-movement unionism,” p. 69). The book is not a difficult read. It does, however, suffer from some imprecise formulations (e.g. “Capitalism is being reconstructed but so also is the world of work,” p. 51).

The most serious weaknesses of *Globalisation and Labour* are of a different sort: its analysis of capitalism is flawed in important respects, and the political strategy for which the book argues is suspect from a radical standpoint.

The book’s analysis of capitalism in the second half of the 20th century relies heavily, though not exclusively, on the work of Regulation School scholars Alain Lipietz and Robert Boyer, as witnessed by tables that depict varieties of Fordism and typologies of Fordism and after-Fordism. Important issues such as global overcapacity in major economic sectors, tendencies to financial crisis and the continued rationality of neo-liberal policies for imperialist capital are neglected.

Thus, while *Globalisation and Labour* notes the false promises and social costs of neo-liberal globalisation, Munck assumes that the institutions of the international mode of regulation, supposedly “required [my emphasis] by the new internationalised production systems and the more flexible labour markets that have developed” (p. 74), could successfully manage contradictions that are, as critics of Regulationism such as Simon Clarke have argued, rooted in capitalist relations of production.

Munck’s view fits well with the notion found in Polanyi that there is a tendency inherent in industrial society to subject markets to democratic regulation. This is, in Polanyi’s words, the “principle of social protection” whose coexistence with the “principle of economic liberalism” is the basis of the “double movement” (quoted on p. 175). While Polanyi’s work is not without value, this conception of clashing principles is inadequate. It is not grounded in an analysis of the struggles of workers and other direct producers against commodification and of how capitalist states engage in the political administration of markets. It also conflates the regulation by unions and states of the sale of labor-power with its decommodification (p. 176).

In keeping with its Polanyian framework, *Globalisation and Labour* contends that neo-liberalism is waning and slowly “the world has been moving ‘beyond’ competition” (p. 180). Suggesting improbably—that “Polanyi can be seen as a theorist of counter-hegemonic movements” (p. 177), Munck proposes that unions work, along with other movements, for a new mode of regulation that includes social clauses (earlier in the book Munck considers arguments for and against social clauses, ultimately concluding that it is necessary to transcend “binary oppositions,” p. 133).

This, he concludes, would be a “revolutionary reform” (p. 193). Quite aside from this dubious claim, the advocacy of social clauses is itself deeply problematic: at a time of growing struggles against neo-liberalism and a renewed questioning of capitalism itself, it aims for slight modifications of agreements that extend and deepen commodification rather than opposing them outright. While this is unfortunate, it is perhaps not surprising, given Munck’s argument at the outset “neither for nor against” globalization.

These analytical and strategic flaws are all the more significant in light of the importance of the issues at stake for working-class movements today and those who identify with them. As a result, *Globalisation and Labour* is a disappointment.

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In this book Lane and Ersson analyze the significance of the state for the economy in the context of globalization. They challenge the dominant paradigm in contemporary political economy, which fails to recognize the central role of the state in the economy and the contribution of governments to economic performance. The central argument of the book is that voluntary economic cooperation in the global market economy is not enough. Globalization calls for
international cooperation. Hence, global markets need state governance through
governmental mechanisms such as intergovernmental organizations, regional
state coordination, and non-governmental organizations.

The book is divided into three main parts. In the first section Lane and
Ersson examine from a theoretical standpoint the interplay between markets and
governments in a globalized economy. They argue that with the arrival of a
global economy, the relation between states and markets has to be redesigned.
They view the role of governments as the guarantors of market economies and
contend that globalization creates the need for new forms of coordination. In this
section Lane and Ersson also analyze empirically the increasing integration and
interconnectedness of countries since World War II, and evaluate the impact of
globalization on the world’s countries along several dimensions, such as develop-
ment and modernization. One of the key conclusions of this part of the book
is that democracy is not necessarily conducive to development.

In the second part of the book Lane and Ersson analyze from a comparative
perspective the basic question in political economy, namely, whether the market
or the state performs the best. They distinguish between various kinds of
capitalist regimes and evaluate their performance based on the following set of
outcomes: affluence, economic growth, inflation, income distribution, and
democracy. Although they show that capitalist economies seem to be more
dynamic than welfare states, they demonstrate that countries with a mixed
economy (i.e. with an activist state that intervenes in the market) do better on all
these evaluation criteria (particularly on inflation, income inequality, and
democracy), with the possible exception of economic growth. According to
them, government fulfills a key task as guardian of property rights and enforcer
of agreements, which helps channel the maximization of self-interests into
Pareto-optimal outcomes. Hence, Lane and Ersson underscore the limitations of
economic models based on the naked pursuit of self-interest and stress the
essential role of state institutions and governments in handling collective action
problems as well as minimizing the disruptive consequences of reneging and
free riding. Finally, while demonstrating the limitations that governments face
changing short-term economic outputs or undoing the business cycle, they
criticize the theoretical approaches that have developed a negative view of the
state, which according to their analysis is mostly relevant to Third World
countries.

The final section of the book examines the challenges to governments from
globalization. Following the argument that they have developed throughout
the book, Lane and Ersson contend that just like the domestic market economy,
the global market economy also needs state governance in order to guarantee the
effective operation of markets. They argue that the basis of global markets,
namely voluntary exchange, needs state protection. Therefore, global state
governance is necessary to facilitate trade and exchange across borders, avoid
war, protect labor and the environment, reduce threats, and mitigate poverty
and crime. They also discuss the current structure of international governance
and examine some of the key institutions for global governance: the United
Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, regional governance,
and, finally, international regimes and organizations. Lane and Ersson discuss
the rationale behind this framework (Hobbes’s efficiency and Grotius’s equity)
and examine possible advances in state integration and cooperation. They
discuss the need for some form of state authority in order to minimize reneging and crime and address collective action problems, currency crises and economic imbalances, and differences in socioeconomic development. Finally, they seek to answer the question of how to regulate the global market economy. They contend that it needs a state to balance it, but acknowledge the unfeasibility (and undesirability) of a world government. They criticize the existing institutional system (it is too weak and fragmented to develop strong coordination among states) and propose the further development of a decentralized system of world governance that promotes humanity’s objectives. Such a system would be built upon the existing global institutional structure but it would reduce veto power and strengthen sanctions against reneging. They conclude showing that although globalization favors market allocation, it also generates new problems and challenges that confirm the need for government, which continues to be vital at the domestic level to the stability of the market economy of countries, and at the international level to effect strong coordination among states.

One of the key contributions of this book is that it shows that there are many roads to economic success in a globalized world. Contrary to the proponents of convergence, who argue that economic integration and globalization are forcing countries to converge toward an Anglo-Saxon model of economic policy characterized by deregulation, liberalization, and limited state intervention in the economy, Lane and Ersson demonstrate empirically that there are different policy combinations that can be successful in a global economy, while showing convincingly that governments can still play a key role in economic success.

At the same time, however, this is a very ambitious book. In reality, we have two books in one. The first two sections are part of a book on comparative political economy; the third one, on the contrary, is an international relations book. The main problem with this approach is that the linkages among the arguments developed throughout the book are not clearly stated and the two leading themes of the book (the distinction between the state and the market, and the need for global governance) are not well integrated. The transition between different sections is somewhat forced, and it is not very clear why they conclude the book with a discussion about the size of government in globalized countries. In addition, by seeking to appeal to a disparate audience they manage to address only the lowest common denominator. For instance, the authors present empirical evidence about the impact of globalization, yet they fail to address in a substantive way the extended criticism against globalization. The authors also fail to discuss substantively the ways in which globalization is supposedly constraining domestic policy-making.

This is also a normative book. It is therefore disappointing that, while the authors develop convincingly throughout the book the problems and limitations of the existing international legal order, they fail to move beyond a timid attempt to strengthen the current institutional framework for global governance. Indeed, while recognizing the need for global governance, Lane and Ersson fail to articulate how we might get from here to there. Unfortunately, they show again how mired we all are in the mindset of nationalism and they prove unable to devise a genuinely new transnational policy institutional framework that would allow global citizens (and economic actors) to operate as true citizens of the world. Furthermore, they fail to address in a substantive way some of the key criticisms that have been raised against the existing global institutions. It is
highly doubtful that critics of these institutions (such as the World Bank, IMF, WTO, or the UN) or globalization in general would be satisfied with a proposed system that would merely build upon the existing global institutional structure and would simply reduce veto power and strengthen sanctions against reneging. How would such a limited reform address problems such as limited coordination, lack of accountability, the democratic deficit, or transparency? How would it help overcome the prioritization of the national interest over the global ones? If governments are losing control over their economies, why should we still invest in the concept of national sovereignty? If coordination by means of voluntary cooperation is insufficient in a global economy, as they argue, why not abandon altogether the existing model based on eroding national sovereignty and develop new independent global institutions?

There are also glaring omissions. For instance, it is surprising that a book on political economy fails to mention one of the most important additions to this literature, namely, the varieties of capitalism approach, which also seeks to explain the differences among the political economies of the developed world and the way in which institutional differences condition economic performance and public policy. In addition, they do not address new theories (now discredited) advanced during the recent economic boom on the end of business cycles, or important paradigms on international relations such as Robert Keohane’s analysis of international regimes. Furthermore, in a book that was published after September 11 it is also startling to find that they do not include international terrorism as one of the critical challenges to the global world. Finally, they do not explain the risks for the global economy (or to the dream of a global institutional framework) associated with the development of regional state coordination (i.e. the European Union, NAFTA, ASEAN).

These shortcomings will provide further ground for discussion on these important issues. Overall this book is an ambitious and impressive attempt to account for the impact of globalization and to reflect upon the distinction between market and state. The empirical analysis is remarkable, and the authors convincingly restate the case for government intervention, as well as the need for global governance. This book should prove a lasting contribution to the field. It will be useful for students and scholars of globalization and political economy.

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How did a small group of nut-jobs in southern California take over the Republican party and persuade a public that elected Lyndon B. Johnson by a historically unprecedented landslide in 1964 to elect Ronald Reagan in 1980? Lisa McGirr’s *Suburban Warriors* tells that story. It provides a compelling and enlightening study of the genesis of the New Right in Orange County, Califor-
nia, during the 1960s—a blow-by-blow account of how the staunchly anti-Communist and conspiratorial Old Right of the John Birch Society popularized its ideological agenda of anti-statism and traditional moralism by shifting to a focus on controversial social issues and evangelical Christianity. The book is compelling and easy to read yet it provides a tremendous wealth of detailed information about Orange County in particular and the American Right in general.

McGirr argues that the combination of libertarian and conservative religious discourses served both the material interests and legitimation needs of the white, middle-class suburbanites who galvanized the New Right. That is to say, the mass base of the New Right is not the farmers and blue-collar working folks of George Wallace’s segregationist South or even the lower-middle-class, white ethnics who became “Reagan democrats,” but rather the educated, affluent, upwardly mobile, white suburbanites, who reap material benefits from tax cuts and reduced government spending, from real estate development and the military-industrial complex, and from the traditional entitlements of white Christian America. In the land of suburban sprawl, these people look to conservative churches to provide community amidst market-driven isolation, a doctrine of moral absolutes in a changing capitalist world, a sense of purpose to counteract meaningless consumerism, and a seal of approval for their acquisitive, self-righteous lifestyles. Thus, the book provides insights that help readers understand how the New Right has been able to sustain its philosophically contradictory coalition between neo-liberal libertarianism and religiously-rooted social conservatism for over 50 years.

Although the book studies only one community, it really functions as a lens through which to view the rise of the New Right on the national level. McGirr sees Orange County as a “prototype: the first functional form of a new conservative milieu that appeared less distinctively elsewhere” (p. 13). She argues that “similar forces have underwritten the growth of more recent boom regions in the South and West” (p. 271), such as Cobb County, Georgia; Jefferson Parish, Louisiana; Dallas and Fort Worth, Texas; Scottsdale and Maricopa County, Arizona; and Colorado Springs, Colorado (pp. 13–14). While the book is repetitive at times, it provides an invaluable look at the machinations of the Right, the history of its rise, the appeal of its philosophically contradictory yet resilient ideology, and the backdrop against which today’s politics must be understood.

Indeed one of the most influential players within the current-day Right emerged precisely from the milieu McGirr describes. James Dobson, founder of Focus on the Family, got his start in the contiguous county of Los Angeles during the 1970s and now operates out of Colorado Springs. Stations of the Cross focuses on Dobson’s tremendously popular radio show and the political work this ostensibly non-political operation accomplishes. In writing this book, Paul Apostolidis hopes to undermine the power of the New Right by illuminating the post-Fordist contradictions that Focus on the Family seeks to manipulate. A creative, provocative, and erudite study, Stations of the Cross deploys the author’s own rereading of Adorno’s cultural criticism to analyze Christian Right radio in the context of the political, economic, and social changes that have developed since the 1970s. Apostolidis calls for the Left to focus some attention on providing Christian conservatives with alternative ways of conceptualizing their anxieties and more productive ways of dealing with them.
Apostolidis’s explanation of the ways in which Dobson’s radio show works on his four million daily listeners is the most convincing and useful part of the book. After listening to 78 Focus on the Family broadcasts, Apostolidis discovered that the show uses a series of figures—the “compassionate professional,” the “humble leader,” and the “forgiving victim”—to manipulate the anxieties of post-Fordist America and instill in the audience the set of attitudes and dispositions needed for acceptance of the Christian Right agenda. Stations of the Cross discusses multiple examples of the ways in which Dobson’s narratives operate, how they relate to real political and social changes in society, how they render people receptive to the Christian Right agenda, and the possibilities they leave open for progressive intervention. It is a complex and challenging book that is definitely worth the effort.

Here is an example of one of Dobson’s narratives. During a time when health and social services are becoming less available and more callous, Dobson presents himself as a “compassionate professional,” following the example of Christ, who really cares about people with problems—like developmentally delayed children, child abuse victims, and homosexuals. However, as Apostolidis demonstrates, Dobson offers compassion only to take it away, and he rhetorically casts out those who reject his normative vision. With a doctorate in psychology, Dobson appeals to science to establish that children must have proper mothering in order to develop normally. Unfortunately, feminists and the irresponsible “ghetto” mothers have done irreparable damage to their children. While Dobson would love to help such children if he could, scientific studies show that once the damage is done, it is too late. Thus, sadly, there is really nothing anyone can do for such children, except pray for them. No need to waste money on social programs. Hopefully, in the future women will “do what God intended” and become traditional mothers. Thus, Dobson speaks to the anxieties generated by the post-Fordist political economy (decreased access to health and social services) by directing listeners to support the policies (spending cuts) that created the problem in the first place. Other examples illustrate similar themes.

While Apostolidis provides a trenchant analysis of the ways in which Dobson’s radio show produces sympathy for his substantive political agenda, he also insists that Christian Right culture should not be understood in purely instrumentalist terms. As part of a historically rooted tradition, evangelical cultural narratives can also “embody a vision of the good life that remains true to a distinctive religious heritage while addressing contemporary experiences” (p. 133). Thus, “the shows featuring the compassionate professional might ironically, if only negatively, harbor a utopian wish for the transformation of the very social circumstances that the new right has helped create, specifically in the areas of health care and social services” (pp. 114–115). Perhaps the utopian aspirations of religious discourse hold out the possibility of progressive political change.

Apostolidis maintains that the contradictions of post-Fordism are not successfully reconciled by Focus on the Family. For example, Dobson tries to reconcile the contradiction between the populist egalitarianism of evangelical Christianity and the authoritarianism of New Right politicians through the figure of the “humble leader,” exemplified by Oliver North and Chuck Colson. On the radio show, the “humble leader” claims simultaneously to be an ordinary
Christian citizen just like the typical listener and also a leader with special responsibilities and secret knowledge who simply cannot be held accountable to anyone other than God for how he wields power. For Dobson, “the issue here clearly is not how citizens can keep reins on their officials’ exercises of public power but rather how citizens can best support their leaders and help them find the strength to follow God’s commands” (p. 156). The message to listeners is that as long as the “humble leader” is a conservative Christian, he can be trusted to do God’s will, and all citizens should do is pray for him.

Apostolidis does not believe that Dobson’s figure successfully reconciles equality with authoritarianism. For Apostolidis, the “humble leader” reflects the contradiction between the appearance of increased opportunities for citizen participation—via talk radio and the Internet, for example—and the actual deterioration of accountability in American politics and civil society during the post-Fordist era. The narrative, he tells us, cannot reconcile this contradiction. But while the contradiction between democracy and authoritarianism may be obvious to Apostolidis, and probably to most readers of Stations of the Cross, it seems to me that for Christian Right true believers, Dobson’s narrative really does reconcile these conflicting values: while all human beings are fundamentally equal, people are called by God for different purposes, some for leadership roles. Indeed, for most of history Christianity has been compatible with authoritarianism—even in populist 19th-century America. While advocates of the social gospel may see authoritarianism as incompatible with their religion, they are not the folks tuning in to Focus on the Family.

In fact, Apostolidis seems to forget who the constituency of the Christian Right is when he formulates his progressive response to Dobson’s show. That is to say, Apostolidis contends that the three figures deployed by Dobson implicitly reveal the problems of post-Fordism. For example, according to Apostolidis, the “forgiving victim,” who forgives violence against women, racism, and abortion, actually illustrates “the acquiescence that post-Fordist society demands of women, minorities, and children in the face of newly exploitative labor conditions and advancing governmental indifference to poverty and inequality” (p. 206, emphasis mine). This highlighted problem, he argues, could potentially be addressed by progressives with alternative solutions. Moreover, he continues,

listening carefully to Focus on the Family yields the unlikely experience that shared ground exists among Dobson’s listeners and, for example, welfare rights advocates, or campaign finance reform activists, or nonviolent resisters of racism. Were such flashes of the utopian in Christian right popular culture to be given more acute, consistent, and self-conscious expression in alternative cultural forms, entrenched dichotomies between “left” and “right” might not so strongly inhibit attempts to build a broad, democratic-populist resistance to the new market-based, political-economic fundamentalism. (p. 21)

He suggests that Left religious people—guided by critical theorists—could appeal to Christian Right supporters more effectively with a religious counter-narrative than liberals could using strictly secular values (p. 218).

In making this argument, Apostolidis seems to overlook the fact that supporters of the Christian Right will not stand in solidarity with welfare rights advocates or campaign finance reform activists because their material interests are oppositional. As Apostolidis himself admits, Dobson speaks “for (and to) a
socioeconomically comfortable or even privileged constituency,” mostly “‘suburban,’ ‘middle- and upper-middle-class people’” (p. 25)—a point underlined by McGirr. That is to say, the hard-core supporters of the New Right take their political position not because they are confused but because they are not: their material interests and legitimation needs are being served by Christian Right narratives. While I agree wholeheartedly that the Left has conceded religious discourse to the Right for too long, progressive appeals, both religiously grounded and secular, should be directed not at the small minority of rightwing ideologues who follow Dobson but rather at the millions and millions of other people whose interests are actually undermined by the agenda of the New Right, many of whom vote Republican against their own self-interest.

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Every year in France there seems to be one book that starts the university calendar with a spectacular debate. In 2002 it was Daniel Lindenberg’s *Le rappel à l’ordre*. The title, which literally means “The calling to order,” is also an oblique historical reference to a rightwing French intellectual rally in the 1930s; and as the subtitle indicates, the book is an “inquiry into the new reactionaries” in the heart of the French intelligentsia. Who are these reactionaries? Are they really “reactionary?” What does that word mean? These are the kinds of questions being hotly debated in an increasingly adversarial climate.

If you’ve never heard of Lindenberg before, do not worry. The name of this philosophy professor from the University of Paris VIII, who sits on the editorial board of the erudite review *l’Esprit*, was relatively unknown to the mass public here in France before he was suddenly thrust into the national media spotlight after the release of his now-famous essay. All at once, his face appeared on television talk shows and glossy magazines. His name was cited in major newspapers and scholarly reviews. To say his book—a dry scholarly treatise—has been a popular success is an understatement. (I bought my copy in a supermarket!) Its critical success, however, is anything but obvious. Even his fellow editors at *l’Esprit* have distanced themselves from this controversial little orange paperback.

What is Lindenberg’s thesis? A “nouvelle réaction” is creeping into French intellectual life, a kind of ideological climate change “whose ramifications can be observed in channels as diverse as works of political and moral philosophy, essays, novels, comic strips, advertising slogans, song lyrics, and naturally the circles, clubs and foundations where the famous ‘elites’ gather” (p. 9). Lindenberg, a historian of ideas, draws from a wide variety of sources, including best-selling novelists such as Michel Houellebecq, Maurice Dantec, and Philippe Muray, and famous contemporary philosophers such as Alain Finkielkraut, Pierre-André Tardieff, and Bernard-Henri Lévy. What Lindenberg wants to show is that these intellectual celebrities, who are former children of the 1960s, have changed over time—become less progressive, more conservative, less
committed to the values of egalitarianism and revolution. In fact, he argues, they have grown to despise the values of 1968.

This “new reaction,” he argues, can be understood as a series of “proces” (“trials”) in which these men have ridiculed mass culture (p. 19), sexual liberation (p. 23), progressive intellectuals (p. 26), the memory of May ’68 (p. 27), human rights discourse (p. 33), openness to Islam (p. 37), and more generally the principles of equality (p. 40). He suggests that this phenomenon can be explained by several factors, such as the “eternal treason of the intellectuals,” who prefer the elites to the masses (p. 46), or the decomposition of a French Marxism à la Louis Althusser into a kind of Situationism à la Guy-Ernest Debord (p. 49).

He argues that the liberating effect of the rock & roll revolution on literature, which freed writers from authoritarianism, has ironically allowed the new reactionary novelists “to push the crudity of language to its extremes in the service of the exact opposite” of what that freedom had been all about (p. 56). Among the philosophers, he points out the use of Leo Strauss as a critique of egalitarian democracy, and the insidious resurrection of the Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt (p. 58). The thrust of the argument is that, without openly declaring it, these new reactionaries have moved incrementally from criticism of liberal democracy to regressive praise for ideas that could be called antidemocratic.

He finds in his “new reactionaries” some familiar themes from the past: the blaming of the problems of the French nation on religious, sexual, and ethnic minorities; the employment of “the strategy of sap,” using satire to show the incompatibility of humor with “political correctness”; the echoes of older antidemocratic thought, such as the “grand critique contrerévolutionnaire” (Burke, De Maistre, Baudelaire), or the neo-aristocratic spirit of “l’Art pour l’Art” (Flaubert, Renan), or intransigent Catholic fundamentalism (Bloy, Bernanos, Thibon). “In reality,” explains Lindenberg, “French intellectuals never really liked democracy very much. They regularly preferred other ruling ideas: authority, revolution, Art for art’s sake. The trial of egalitarian democracy, of the ‘tyranny of numbers,’ is a constant in their history” (p. 69). He warns his readers that the intelligentsia, by shifting to the Right, is supporting ideas that justify racism, sexism, and elitism, reminding them of the strong showing of Jean-Marie Le Pen and the National Front in the recent national elections. “The new reactionary thought exists,” he concludes. “Will this ideology find a new political outlet?” (p. 82).

No sooner was his book released in late October 2002 than a series of scathing criticisms were published, mostly by the men he had called “new reactionaries.” Some of them claimed that their words had been taken out of context. Pierre Manent, from the EHESS, claimed that Lindenberg had “evoked two words I’d pronounced in response to an interview in Le Figaro in which I tried to explain the result of the first round of the presidential elections by a triple depossession of French society. Basically he wanted to denounce me of being an anti-European fanatic!”

Seven of the so-called reactionaries defended themselves in a “Manifesto” claiming that Lindenberg was mistaken: he had mistaken their criticism of democratic practices for antidemocratic thought: “We are democrats, and as we love and respect democracy, we know that it never ceases to feed itself on

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1 Le Monde, November 22, 2002 (Muslim immigration, European integration, and American hegemony).
criticism, the very heart of its proper functioning.” They adopted an affirmative defense, admitting many of the critical views imputed to them, but justifying them in the name of democracy.

Yes, we think that the dissatisfactions felt by many French who only have universal suffrage to express themselves need to be analysed and discussed. Yes, we are worried about the growing indifference of elites who abandon the people to their fate of public and social insecurity. Yes, we think that the promotion of the youthful values of 68 as a supreme value is a disservice. Yes, we refuse to see our republican schools abandon the weakest and restrict their condition in the name of general knowledge. Yes, we deplore the de-politicisation of men being encouraged by a rights-of-man discourse that is in love with itself, deaf to any idea of debt, obligation or responsibility to the world, and that avoids geopolitical thinking. Yes, we think that the progressive abandonment of the French model of integration, a fact of necessity and generosity, is an error of which the immigrant populations are the first victims.2

One of the authors elsewhere wrote that what he found the most irritating “was that none of the philosophers stigmatised by Lindenberg explicitly affirmed a preference for a pre-democratic or an anti-democratic social order!” He also pointed out a problem with Lindenberg’s terminology. “The reader will observe that the object of this denunciatory litany is not defined, that it is in no manner constructed like a category of political-ideological analysis.”3

According to his critics, “new reactionaries” is an “empty concept,” a simple category of amalgam. The major critique of Lindenberg’s book is precisely that he is an amalgamator, that he has amalgamated different kinds of thinkers into a single over-simplistic category.

What rapport exists between the respective thinking of Jean-Claude Miller and Pierre Manent? Between that of Alain Badiou and Marcel Guachet? Between that of Regis Debray and Shmuel Trigano? Between that of Pierre Bourdieu (even he!) and Alain Finkielkraut? Between Alain Desancon and Jacques-Alain Miller? To respond to such prejudicial questions it would have been necessary for the denouncer of all these figures of intellectual life to begin by scrupulously comparing and analysing their works, instead of citing or vaguely paraphrasing them, with systematic malevolence, from truncated extracts of hastily read interviews.4

Lindenberg’s thesis has defied any one single description. The authors of the Manifesto denounced his work as “Stalinism,” an intellectual “witch hunt.” Others have compared him to a Grand Inquisitor putting their names on an “Index.”5 Some have accused him of closing his eyes to French anti-Semitism, and have labeled him “pro-Palestinian.”6 His views have been alternatively labeled as “liberal,”7 as “Tocquevillian,”8 and even “extremism of the center.”9

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2 *L’Express*, November 28, 2002. The authors of the “Manifesto” were Alain Finkielkraut, Marcel Gauchet, Pierre Manent, Philippe Muray, Pierre-André Taguieff, Shmuel Trigano, and Paul Yonnet.
8 Alain Renaut, *ibid.*
9 Marcel Gauchet, *ibid.*
Perhaps the label that carries the most innuendo was that of “social Christian.” For the journal he represents—l’Esprit—had been founded in 1932 by the social Catholic philosopher Emmanuel Mounier, and Lindenberg somewhat resembles Julien Benda.

Jean Claude Milner, one of the “new reactionaries,” had published a piece in Le Monde in which he actually identified Lindenberg’s ideas with a vaguely defined “social-Christian” current: placing social issues above all others; using social issues as the criteria by which all works are judged either favorably (“progressive”) or unfavorably (“reactionary”); fighting delinquency with prevention; preferring a single school system for all; preferring rights to freedoms; and most of all, preferring freedom of results over freedom of opportunity. With such kinds of associations between Lindenberg and social-Christian thought in the press, the friends of l’Esprit began to mobilize. The president of the Association des Amis d’Emmanuel Mounier, Guy Coq, actually published an editorial in Le Figaro demanding the editorial board of l’Esprit distance itself from Lindenberg and speak out against his thesis.

After two months of polemic revolving around his book, the editorial board of l’Esprit finally broke its uncomfortable silence, which some had interpreted as its tacit agreement. Thus the editors published a special 15-page section on the “Lindenberg affair” in the first issue of 2003. While they did not support his thesis, neither did they denounce it. For the most part the editors took a distanced tone. Only Veronique Nahoum-Grappe assumed his defense, suggesting that his detractors had blown everything out of proportion to what was only a little 94-page book. “Their campaign resembles mosquito hunting with a bazooka.” At any rate, there is blood on the wall.

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The feminist and multicultural democratic theory literature is both complex and disturbing. Here is theoretical scholarship truly engaged with the muck of practical politics. It is a literature essentially devoted to the problem of how to take what are, in the face of the current regime, almost quaint notions of justice, equality, and diversity and use them to fashion suggestions for the development of full, vibrant democracies. It asks how we can do this without merely restating some version of coalition politics or a new set of pluralist models. Which groups should have preferential treatment? Which experiences ought to count as marginal? Under what conditions might marginalized groups come together to challenge the white, male, heterosexual elite? Do Clarence Thomas and Condoleezza Rice really represent what we mean by diversity? Nancy Fraser, Lani Guinier, Kathleen Jones, Jane Mansbridge, Anne Phillips, and Iris Young are just of few of the scholars who have taken up these questions in the recent past. It

11 Ibid.
is here that Marla Brettschneider’s work, Democratic Theorizing from the Margins, enters the fray.

The book is very clearly and beautifully written. While Brettschneider is more likely to pose questions than to provide answers, the questions strike me as exactly the ones democratic theory ought to be focusing on. The book is strongest where Brettschneider synthesizes discussions from democratic theory and canonical texts in western thought with a wide array of theories from a variety of social movements. She does this masterfully with a sublime sensitivity to difference and a keen sense of the intellectual nuances of any given argument. Her book is unusual in its inclusion, for example, of Native American, Puerto Rican, and Jewish histories. This is particularly welcome, as those have so often been ignored in books of this sort. Another particular strength of the book is its linking of these often little known histories to political theory. This is rarely done, and it sets Brettschneider’s work apart. Another very strong aspect of this work is Brettschneider’s discussion of American pluralism. To my knowledge, the link between multiculturalism and pluralism has not been made explicit, and it is an important point. That this points to a move towards self-interest and the liberalization of the Left in America should probably be said somewhere. Finally, I appreciated Brettschneider’s respectful attention and inclusion of Marxism as well as they way she uses postmodern theory.

Encouraging scholars and activists to think beyond such dualisms as universal/particular and public/private, she makes some fresh suggestions. Perhaps spheres of political activism and alternative can be found in the family, in the values of friendship, and within female comradeship. She writes, “By looking at women’s active experiences in some less formal spaces that they have carved for themselves out of the collective life, we are presented with an alternative possibility for their lives as citizens in the more formal arena of politics” (pp. 124–125). She suggests not only that there are “multiple publics,” but that we must pay attention to multiplicities within identity formations. She writes, for example, that “an Iraqi Jew born and raised as a citizen of the United States might know, recognize or relate to phrases in Arabic, Hebrew, Aramaic, Judeo-Arabic, Yiddish, Ladino and English.” Furthermore, she may speak and write each of these in any number of various social spaces she inhabits, and she may do so with varying degrees of proficiency (pp. 156–158).

This book will be useful to scholars and advanced students in political science, history, sociology, and ethnic studies, gay and lesbian studies and gender studies. Because of its clear presentation, I could even imagine it getting some undergraduate course adoptions. The principal audience would probably be, however, democratic and communitarian theorists.

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